Please join me in welcoming Sam Altman. [APPLAUSE] This class was designed as an inspiration from a set of different experiences while I was a student here. One of them was Terry Winograd's intro seminar CS-47M, Computers and the Open Society. But a second one that was a pretty formative experience for me, and a lot of my friends and peers on campus at the time in 2014, was CS-183, How to Start a Startup by Sam. And so it's really cool to have you back.
What's it like? How's it feeling for you to be back? I was thinking as I was walking in, if I had just a little more time, I would do an update to that class because I think everything about starting a startup has changed so much, and I have not seen anyone do a good version of how you're supposed to make a starter now. So I had that-- just walking in here, I had that, oh, it'd be fun to do it again. So, timeline wise you thought that in '14. I think OpenAI was founded in 2015? Is that right? '16 basically. '16, OK. So then you went-- it was like you were-- it felt to me from an observer perspective that you had come up with your working theory for how to do it right, and then you went and tried to implement it.
Is that a fair assessment or is that not the case? OpenAI was like the strangest startup of the last, maybe, a couple of decades in Silicon Valley because it started as a research lab. It was really not a company at all. And the kind of normal course of startups is that you start a product company, and then it grows for a while, and then growth slows down, and then you start a research lab and you like bolt that on, and you try to figure out the next thing to do. And we were the opposite of that. We were a research lab first that later had to bolt on a startup. And I don't really recommend that.
It's kind of an unusual thing, but that's not quite what I meant. What I meant is we still followed the pre-AI rules of a startup because we were trying to make it. We didn't have it yet. But now, watching what the best startups do is so different than how startups work even a couple of years ago that I think someone-- I'm probably not going to do it-- someone should do that class again. And what would be the biggest updates you'd make based on your data? With an affordable amount of spend on tokens, you can do what a 100-person, incredibly great engineering team would do as a startup.
And that was just totally impossible. That was not in the set of options for a startup, and now it is. So I think what you can take on, the level of ambition you can have, the speed of which you can move, the amount of stuff you can do at once, it's just totally different. And does that change the shape of the problems you feel like you assign at the end of the class for people to attack at the end of that quarter if you were teaching it again? I don't think assigning problems to attack ever works because if you like-- if I can think of a problem-- if I can think of a really great startup idea, if it's, obvious, enough to me, then it's probably obvious to a lot of people.
When we started OpenAI, we were one of maybe-- generously speaking-- four AGI efforts in the world. And you want to find something like that. And I'm sure that there exists something today that just wasn't possible at all pre, like, automated coding era that is totally non-obvious, that will be a multi-trillion dollar market soon. And that only four companies are working on it right now, but I don't know what that is. It's much more likely you all know what that is than I know what that is. My brain is like taken over by OpenAI. But, the kind of idea someone can assign you to work on is probably not what you want. Yep.
OK, so that's fair. But I think it would be helpful, since this is a systems class, to maybe reason about a particular problem that you have to reason through so that they can then apply the shape of the techniques used to break down from a systems perspective, that problem into solutions to their own problems. And a concept that you had started to tease in the class back in 2014 and then clearly you've talked about publicly over the years is scale. Scale is its own beast. Its quantities, its own quality. Scale as a concept has been something it seems like you've empirically investigated in all kinds of ways over the last 10 years or so.
Could you help us, first unpack what you mean by scale now, 10 years later, how would you deconstruct that as a systems design attribute to apply, whether it's as a tool? Can we start there? Yes. So I don't know why the following observation is true. I offer no theory that I find satisfying to explain it, and that makes me a little bit nervous to suggest you follow it, but I'm going to anyway because, empirically, it does seem to be true, which is all of the most interesting things I have observed in my career in watching other things happen.
All of the most interesting ones have had something to do with emergent properties that scale or scale continuing to provide returns far beyond what the consensus thinks will work. And this, obviously, happens with scaling laws for AI models, but this happens with getting more smart people together to think about one problem in a research setting. This happens with companies and the economy of scale you can get all in all these different ways. I really learned this at Y Combinator when it became clear to me that everybody was saying, oh, Y Combinator has gotten too big.
It should shrink. We should fund less companies per batch. The best times of Y Combinator, when it was like 10 companies per batch. And a lot of very smart people were saying this, and it was like tempting because it would have been much less work. And the theory was that the best companies are always kind of obvious, and then you fund the rest and it's not as helpful. But a huge part of the magic of what made YC work were-- was the network effects inside of the batch. And that was an emergent property at scale that just hadn't been discovered before. No one had tried to fund startups at scale in the same way, and thus no one had ever happened upon this observation of when you do that.
There's something important that happens that just didn't exist at all at the 1/10 but 1/100 of a scale. There's a bunch of other examples like this, and I'll skip them in the interest of time. But I would say, again, I offer no explanation for why, but empirically speaking, when you find a time that you can push on-- you can push something to a scale people have not tried before, and it's already working in some interesting way at the smaller scale, more often than not, that seems to be a good idea.
And that also seems to be something that most people don't do enough. And I don't offer an explanation for this either but when we were, like, we're really going to scale AI models, all of the geniuses in the field, most of them were, oh, this isn't really working. That's barely a scientific result. It's not interesting that it gets better at scale. You've already shown that, why keep scaling it? So I mentioned the YC example, I've seen a lot of startup founders where they're like, well, there might be something interesting would happen if I scaled this up, but I'm a little worried about it for non-specific reasons.
And, again, looking back at a huge data set of people that have scaled their companies in all these different ways, there's almost always interesting stuff there. So I think, directionally, that's like an interesting thing to push on and severely underexplored. On the systems design part of that, I think one reason people don't do it as much is stuff breaks at an accelerating rate and in an unpredictable way as you scale it. And if you are going to really scale something, it's always like a little bit broken.
There are always very smart people who say why you shouldn't do this, don't get too ambitious, don't get too big, let's try this smaller, and so breaking that down is a systems problem. I'll use the thing of when we were scaling up AI models, there was technically can we do this at all? This seems crazy. Like, no one had ever thought about trying to do a run across 10,000 or 100,000 GPUs, and that was going to require stacks of engineering talent. There was the capital requirements and what it was going to take to do this. And like, how is there ever going to be a business? How can you think about taking this risk? There was this sort of cultural stuff of researchers saying, well, if we're going to get all this compute, why do we put it all into this one project where we're not going to learn something?
Why not divide it up among all these projects? And this also happens in every area. I've looked at almost every area for scale, and breaking it down into each difficult area or each reason not to do it and trying to address them one at a time, yeah, that's been really important. I'm going to push on that a little bit because there's very few people who've been able to repeatedly scale new products and systems the way the OpenAI team has over the years, but it seems like one of the issues is there are all these prior conditioning sort of mental models and expectations humans have, and you said things break.
And one of the things it seems often breaks that's the hardest to refactor is the human side of the systems design, wherever there's human implementers or there's human participants in that. And so what have you learned about humans at scale-- organizing humans at scale to participate in a system that may not be just a redo of some past system that they get naively on-- at a priori on first blush? I think a clear goal, a clear plan to get there, and a clear answer to the way that you're going to get there and how you're going to make decisions along the way, that's very important.
So if we go back to the example of when we decided to scale up models, there were a lot of people who were like, ah, this isn't really going to work. It's going to have these problems. It's also not-- we need a more diversified portfolio. But once we say, no, we're going to make a bet on scaling deep learning. That's our thing. If we're wrong, we'll fail, but we're going to do that, here's why we're going to do that, here's what we believe about what the state of the world can be like if we get there. That's very powerful. And then for whatever reason, we did not evolve to be good at thinking about exponentials.







